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Saturday 19 May 2012

Sanity

Sanity is like a thin crust of stability over underlying horrors. At some places, some times, it is stout and pliant, but at others, it is paper-thin. You could poke a hole in it with a finger, peel it away with a nail, and lay bare the raw core of irrationality, the fears, the demons...

One can see the hollowness of this veneer, the superficiality, the pomposity, the self-indulgence and the myopic ignorance. I can understand why the mad sometimes pity the sane. Yet, I would not abandon sanity, nor I would rob someone of it, unless (until?) I had something better to offer in its stead. The insanity that lurks beneath — the insanity I attempt to 'cure' (oh, the arrogance!) — is no better a replacement. No wisdom to bargain chaos for order, albeit artificial and arbitrary that state of array may be.

One may possibly seek something above, but any über-sanity to my mortal eyes would appear no different from lunacy.

Vulnerable

'In this life, I learn strength; in the next one, I can be strong enough to be vulnerable.'

Thursday 17 May 2012

Two Articles About Child Psychiatry

Two fascinating articles I read recently related to child psychiatry:

* Psychopathy in children
* A 6 year old Schizophrenic who might possibly have been born mentally-ill

Serotonin and the Mystic Potential

A 2003 study The Serotonin System and Spiritual Experiences published in The American Journal of Psychiatry reveals an interesting correlation between Serotonin receptor density in the brain and the capacity for spiritual experiences. Given the limitations, the results of this study must be interpreted with caution; however this may reveal insight into the biology behind the fact that not everyone is capable of mystic experiences. 

And of course, it would be erroneous to interpret this study as demonstrating that mystic experiences are 'all in the head'. The study proves no such thing.

"In the present study, we found an association between interindividual variability in 5-HT1A receptor binding potential and the self-transcendence score on the Temperament and Character Inventory. We found no correlation for any of the other dimensions. The lack of correlation for the other dimensions is consistent with a previous study that used Tridimensional Personality Questionnaire, and an earlier questionnaire covering the four temperament dimensions of the Temperament and Character Inventory.

The self-transcendence dimension is the most stable Temperament and Character Inventory dimension over time and is also one of the two Temperament and Character Inventory dimensions showing the largest variability. The self-transcendence dimension consists of three subscales representing several aspects of religious behavior, subjective experience, and individual worldview. Of interest, in the extended analysis, we found that the correlation of self-transcendence was shown to be fully dependent on the spiritual acceptance scale, whereas no correlation was found to the other two subscales. (My emphasis)

The spiritual acceptance scale measures a person’s apprehension of phenomena that cannot be explained by objective demonstration. Subjects with high scores tend to endorse extrasensory perception and ideation, whether named deities or a commonly unifying force. Low scorers, by contrast, tend to favor a reductionistic and empirical worldview.

A role for the serotonin system in relation to spiritual experiences is supported by observations of drugs such as LSD, psilocybin, N,N-dimethyltryptamine, mescaline, and 3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine that are known to cause perturbations of the serotonin system in several brain regions.

On a behavioral level, these drugs elicit perceptual distortions, illusions, a sense of insight, spiritual awareness, mystical experiences, and religious ecstasy. Of interest, such pharmacological effects induced by hallucinogens resemble the extrasensory perception and ideation endorsed by subjects scoring high on the spiritual acceptance scale.

However, another drug causing spiritual experiences is salvatorin A. This drug may act primarily on the kappa opioid receptor system, indicating that the serotonin system is not the only brain neurotransmitter system that may be related to spiritual experiences."

Wednesday 16 May 2012

Multiverse

Does Multiverse answer the Fine Tuning Argument?

It possibly could, if it is shown that physical constants actually exist over all possible ranges. If so, then it would explain why we have the appearance of fine tuning.

Does Multiverse answer the question "Where do the laws of physics come from?"?

No. Because in the setting of the Multiverse, there would still be a set of more fundamental bedrock laws whose origin will not be accounted for.



"An astonishing concept has entered mainstream cosmological thought: physical reality could be hugely more extensive than the patch of space and time traditionally called “the universe.” We’ve learnt that we live in a solar system that is just one planetary system among billions, in one galaxy among billions. But there are signs that a further Copernican demotion confronts us. The entire panorama that astronomers can observe could be a tiny part of the aftermath of our Big Bang, which is itself just one bang among a potentially infinite ensemble. In this grander perspective, what we’ve traditionally called the laws of nature may be no more than parochial bylaws—local manifestations of “bedrock” laws that must be sought at a still deeper level."


"But, the philosopher says, What about the laws of physics? They are something, not nothing—and where do they come from? Well, says Krauss — trying to be patient — there’s another promising theoretical approach that plausibly posits a “multiverse”: a possibly infinite collection of self-contained, non-interacting universes, each with is own laws of nature. In fact, it might well be that the multiverse contains universes with every possible set of laws. We have the laws we do simply because of the particular universe we’re in. But, of course, the philosopher can respond that the multiverse itself is governed by higher-level laws."

Moral Irony

It is one of the biggest ironies that morality itself has such unfairness in its roots.

Morality is unfair because the moral challenges that individuals face are not of equal difficulty and are without uniform chances of success. For example, the moral challenge that a paedophile faces is of much greater difficulty with a much greater chance of failure compared to us. 

Related posts:
A Moment of Judgment
Moral Luck

Monday 14 May 2012

Feminism and Choice

Beentherella writes brilliantly and with great clarity about feminism and choice in her recent blog post, something that I have been trying to highlight for a long time myself:

"I always took great care to separate the rhetoric about choice with some basic rules that feminism did initially aspire to achieve before it forayed into its present dark alley of dada-ist and gaga-ist absurdities. Yes, feminism is about choice but one needs to be honest about the fact that it is also about making certain types of choices, whether or not we like to admit it. Putting a burgeoning career on hold for love is by no means a 'feminist' choice and I would refrain from calling it one. Neither is putting off a PhD for several years because one wants to start a family first. These are choices and women must be free to make them, but no, they are not feminist choices. It would be childish of me to try and take the course many women do of trying to defend their choices by labelling them as feminist just to feel better about themselves. It is counterproductive and it confuses the discourse, and frankly, feminism is a confused enough discourse to begin with! I suppose what it boils down to is accepting ones choices for what they are and still taking pride in the face that one made them."

Sunday 6 May 2012

A Semantic Version of Russell's Paradox

"The mother of all the logical and semantic paradoxes was Russell’s paradox, named for its author, twentieth-century English philosopher Bertrand Russell. It goes like this: “Is the set of all sets that are not members of themselves a member of itself?” This one is a real screamer—that is, if you happen to have an advanced degree in mathematics. But hang on. Fortunately, two other twentieth-century logicians named Grelling and Nelson came along with a more accessible version of Russell’s paradox. It’s a semantic paradox that operates on the concept of words that refer to themselves.

Here goes: There are two kinds of words, those that refer to themselves (autological) and those that don’t (heterological). Some examples of autological words are “short” (which is a short word), “polysyllabic” (which has several syllables), and our favorite, “seventeen-lettered” (which has seventeen letters). Examples of heterological words are “knockkneed” (a word that has no knees, touching or otherwise) and “monosyllabic” (a word that has more than one syllable). The question is: Is the word “heterological” autological or heterological? If it’s autological, then it’s heterological. If it’s heterological, then it’s autological. Ha! Ha!"

Thomas Catchcart & Daniel Klein, Plato and a Platypus Walk Into A Bar... Understanding Philosophy Through Jokes


Tuesday 1 May 2012

Monday 30 April 2012

Prof. Louis Levy on Love

Woody Allen's fictional philosopher Prof. Louis Levy in the film Crimes and Misdemeanors has some interesting thoughts to share...


* “You will notice that what we are aiming at when we fall in love is a very strange paradox. The paradox consists of the fact that when we fall in love we are seeking to re-find all or some of the people to whom we were attached as children. On the other hand we ask of our beloved to correct all of the wrongs that these early parents or siblings inflicted on us. So that love contains in it a contradiction, the attempt to return to the past and the attempt to undo the past.”

* “But we must always remember that when we are born we need a great deal of love to persuade us to stay in life. Once we get that love, it usually lasts us. But the universe is a pretty cold place. It’s we who invest it with our feelings. And under certain conditions, we feel that the thing isn’t worth it anymore.”

She pretended not to see me

Saturday 28 April 2012

Revitalizing the Abortion Debate: Virtue Ethics

I would like to talk about a very insightful paper in this post and some future ones: Virtue Theory and Abortion by Rosalind Hursthouse. In this article Hursthouse defends virtue theory against some of the common criticisms against it which arise from an inadequate understanding of the theory, and illustrates the usage of virtue ethics by applying it to the issue of morality of abortion.

In this post I am going to briefly summarize how her discussion of abortion from a virtue ethical perspective is radically different from much of the contemporary philosophical literature on this topic.

Most debates on the morality of abortion tend to revolve around two considerations:
1) the status of the fetus
2) women's rights with regards to their bodies

Virtue Ethics transforms (and refreshes, I'd say) the whole moral debate on abortion by showing how both of these considerations are fundamentally irrelevant to the morality of abortion. Consider women's rights. If we assume that a woman has the right to terminate a pregnancy, the only thing that follows is that a law forbidding abortion will be unjust, but it says nothing about the morality of the act of abortion itself, because even when exercising one's moral right one may act viciously: with cruelty, selfishness, stupidity, dishonesty, etc. Hursthouse notes:

'Love and friendship do not survive their parties' constantly insisting on their rights, nor do people live well when they think that getting what they have a right to is of pre-eminent importance; they harm others, and they harm themselves. So whether women have a moral right to terminate their pregnancies is irrelevant within virtue theory, for it is irrelevant to the question "In having an abortion in these circumstances, would the agent be acting virtuously or viciously or neither?"'

Regarding the status of the fetus, Hursthouse says that this issue is not in the province on any moral theory; it is a metaphysical issue and that too a difficult one. To be able to make a morally wise decision about abortion, must a virtuous agent first possess knowledge of the status of the fetus, knowledge that is as yet uncertain and subject to much debate? One of the assumptions of Virtue Ethics is that intellectual and philosophical sophistication is not a necessary condition of moral wisdom, and if accepted, it leads to the surprising conclusion that the moral status of the fetus is not relevant to the morality of abortion. What is relevant, in fact, are the familiar biological facts: that pregnancy arises as a result of sexual intercourse, that its duration is about 9 months, and this is the time in which the fetus grows and develops, that pregnancy is often painful and emotional charged for the woman, etc. Hursthouse feels that the conviction that one needs to go beyond these familiar biological facts to conclude from them something about whether the fetus has the right to life or not has terribly alienated current philosophical literature from the psycho-social realities of child-bearing.

Regarding what virtue ethics says about the morality of abortion, I'll save that for a future post.

(hat-tip to Komal for sharing this paper with me)

Post-Prozac Nation

Post-Prozac Nation: The Science and History of Treating Depression
This is among the best articles that I've read on the patho-physiology of clinical depression in the context of the debate surrounding anti-depressant medications.

Saturday 14 April 2012

The Desire for a Desire

Me: It's interesting how we can have desires to have other desires. An example that occurs to me as I revise endocrinology: a patient with low libido may often still have the desire to have the sexual desire. It is not just the unfulfilled desires that trouble us, but also at times the absence of desires.

Aati: Interesting observation. Why do you think it is so?

Me: A number of reasons, I suppose. One important and common one is to possess a memory. A patient who once had an active sexual life remembers the pleasures of a fulfilled sexual desire, now lost to him. Compare this with someone who never felt sexual desire at all ever in life. Another reason that comes to mind: social norms. It is normal for a teenager to be obsessed with sex. An asexual teenager may end up feeling abnormal for lacking an interest in sex, and the desire for conformity may cause him to desire to have sexual desire.

Aati: And my two cents to that... it's like puberty in reverse, emotionally. Lack of desire belies the illusion you had that you know exactly what's going on inside you, inside your mind, supposedly under your control. Your body once again becomes a stranger to you, an obstinate stranger who sullenly juts out her jaw and refuses to budge. You push it, trying to order it so as to get back to the semblance of your own 'normal' that you'd come to accept, but the more you try to get back to the familiar, the more a stranger it becomes. This isn't like me! You want to say, and that brings with it the dreaded, disgruntling or despairing feeling that perhaps you never really knew what that sentence meant.

Susanna as Naked and Nude

I happened to read an interesting paper today Women in the Nude: A Study of Susanna and the Elders by Han Xinzhen Pema, which is a comparative analysis of two paintings based on the biblical story of Susanna and the Elders; one by Jacopo Tintoretto and the other by Artemisia Gentileschi.



Susanna and the Elders by Jacopo Tintoretto


Susanna and the Elders by Artemisia Gentileschi.


Some excerpts are below:

* "One of the most popular themes was a story from the apocryphal Book of Susanna, Chapter 1, about Susanna and the Elders (1:1-1:64). Susanna was the beautiful wife of the prosperous Jew, Joacim. As Joacim was wealthy and honorable, many Jews came to him for counsel and two Elders who were elected as judges that year frequented Joacim’s house often. They began to lust after Susanna and conspired to seduce her together. Hiding in the garden where she bathed, they sprang on the unsuspecting Susanna and threatened to accuse her of committing adultery with another man if she did not submit to their advances. The virtuous Susanna  chose to die rather than dishonor her husband. Fortunately, she was saved by the prophet Daniel who uncovered the truth by interrogating the Elders separately. Susanna was proven innocent of adultery and the Elders were stoned to death for their crimes."

* "The two paintings, despite having the same subject matter and being painted a mere fifty years apart, portray Susanna and the Elders in vastly different ways. While Artemisia’s version clearly shows Susanna’s fear and repulsion as a woman under the threat of rape, Tintoretto’s version of Susanna seems designed to display her feminine charms to the viewer. A viewer would feel inclined to empathize with Artemisia’s Susanna and her plight as a victim of sexual harassment. However, a viewer would be more inclined to view Tintoretto’s Susanna with an appreciation for the beauty of her feminine form while remaining emotionally detached from her plight. In this essay, I shall compare the two paintings and show how Tintoretto’s version objectifies Susanna for  the viewing pleasure of a male audience, while Artemisia’s feminist version is able to show the unfortunate plight of Susanna and move the viewer."

* "Now, according to Berger “to be naked is to be oneself. To be nude is to be seen naked by others and yet not recognized for oneself”. This differentiation of the naked and nude is derived from Berger’s interpretation of Kenneth Clark’s statement “that to be naked is to be without clothes, whereas the nude is a form of art”. Nakedness is essentially a state of undress whereas nudity involves the gaze, a “way of seeing”. A naked woman becomes a nude when she is the subject of a gaze. She is objectified in the process. 

In Tintoretto’s painting, the naked Susanna on her own is free to do as she likes and express herself however she wants to, but in the eyes of the Elders and viewer, she ceases to have any personal identity and is merely an object to be ogled at. Her nude body plainly acts as a magnet to attract the attention of the viewer. It has no other consequential purpose or worth. Her porcelain skin and immaculately done hair only serve to emphasize her perfection and show her objectification.
  
In the case of Artemisia’s Susanna, Susanna may be naked but she is not a nude. Susanna’s hair is disheveled and messy and her washcloth is draped across her thigh as if it was dropped in a hurry. Her appearance is that of a woman who was surprised in the middle of her actions instead of a mannequin posing in an aesthetically beautiful way like Tintoretto’s Susanna. The awkward twisting of her body away from the Elders and the positioning of her arms to fend off the Elders make it obvious that instead of appearing like an object, she is in the midst of a situation which she is actively seeking to avoid."

For some more paintings on this subject see here.

Friday 13 April 2012

Pretense

Perhaps all self-identity begins with a pretense.

Reproduction and Moral Obligation

An excerpt from The Case Against Kids by Elizabeth Kolbert on New Yorker:

"Benatar’s case rests on a critical but, in his view, unappreciated asymmetry. Consider two couples, the A’s and the B’s. The A’s are young, healthy, and rich. If they had children, they could give them the best of everything—schools, clothes, electronic gaming devices. Even so, we would not say that the A’s have a moral obligation to reproduce.

The B’s are just as young and rich. But both have a genetic disease, and, were they to have a child together, that child would suffer terribly. We would say, using Benatar’s logic, that the B’s have an ethical obligation not to procreate.

The case of the A’s and the B’s shows that we regard pleasure and pain differently. Pleasure missed out on by the nonexistent doesn’t count as a harm. Yet suffering avoided counts as a good, even when the recipient is a nonexistent one.

And what holds for the A’s and the B’s is basically true for everyone. Even the best of all possible lives consists of a mixture of pleasure and pain. Had the pleasure been forgone—that is, had the life never been created—no one would have been the worse for it. But the world is worse off because of the suffering brought needlessly into it.

“One of the implications of my argument is that a life filled with good and containing only the most minute quantity of bad—a life of utter bliss adulterated only by the pain of a single pin-prick—is worse than no life at all,” Benatar writes."

Wait a sec! I don't think that the implication spelled out at the end follows from the reasoning at all. There is a huge difference between a life of terrible suffering due to a genetic disease and a life of utter bless punctuated by a single pin-prick! The B's would have no obligation not to procreate if their child were to have such a blissful life.

While the reasoning makes notes of terrible suffering, it doesn't acknowledge moments or lives of extra-ordinary significance: to possess a genius, like that of Mozart or Einstein, to do something of ever-lasting impact, like Jesus or Marx, etc. I am not sure even with these one can have a moral obligation to reproduce, but it does take the steam out of the reasoning presented above.

Tuesday 3 April 2012

Marriage

Two tweets by Alain de Botton (@alaindebotton):

* Society had to stop caring whether we're married to reveal that our motives for marriage are far weirder than social pressure. 

* Perhaps we get married in the hope we'll never have to suffer because of love again.

Thursday 29 March 2012

Context

'If there are any universal rules or principles of morality, it is because we share a common context, minimally, the context of being "human".'

Robert C. Solomon, Living with Nietzsche

A Universe From Nothing

A fatal philosophical critique of Lawrence M. Krauss' recent book ‘A Universe From Nothing’ by David Albert.

Marx at 193

Marx at 193: an excellent analysis of Marx's relevance to the contemporary world and the accuracy of his predictions by John Lanchester.

Sunday 25 March 2012

Why Freud Matters

In this article at NYT, Benjamin Y. Fong talks about what he thinks is of value in Freud's psychoanalysis, and that if psychoanalysis experiences a cultural death, then something of worth would be lost. He identifies this insight as:

'... the relation between two realms of psychic activity that Freud called the “primary” and “secondary” processes. The former domain is instinctual and relentless, a deep reservoir of irrational drives that lie just beneath the apparently calm façade of our civilized selves. The latter is the façade itself, the measured and calculating exterior we unconsciously create to negotiate everyday life. Although these two terms are somewhat obscure, the basic divide between them is familiar to the point of obviousness.'

The more we submit to dominant cultural norms, and the more we ignore the inner impulses, the more the subconscious drives fester and agitate, ultimately expressing them in subtle and not-so-subtle ways and manifesting in various everyday and pathological neuroses. The usual means employed to handle this situation are further suppression by means of rigorous training in rational thinking and social norms, and by talking small 'vacations' -- periods of time in which we suspend our rational selves to satisfy the inner impulses.

What Freud proposed was a different approach: a conversation between the conscious and the unconscious, where a person can talk to another without having to filter his thoughts for the sake of propriety and without the fear of being judged. This communication between the two offers the possibility of a change: 

'What Freud proposed, and what remains revolutionary in his thought today, is that human beings have the capacity for real change, the kind that would undo the malicious effects of our upbringings and educations so as to obviate the need for “breaks from real life,” both voluntary and involuntary.'

'Against our culture of productivity and its attendant subculture of “letting off steam,” Freud hypothesized that the best way to refashion our world for the better is to adopt a new way of speaking to one another. Above all, this radical way of talking is defined by what appears to be extended pointlessness, something we are increasingly incapable of tolerating as the world around us moves ever faster. There are books to read, mouths to feed, meetings to attend, corporations to fight or defend, new places to visit, starving children to save…who has the time? And yet it is precisely in not allowing ourselves the time to be “unproductive” that reality is insured to remain rigid and unchanging.'

It is this 'new way of speaking to one another' that is of value, and I do not think that it is something that necessarily requires a session with a trained psychotherapist. The essence of it can be attained in our close and intimate relationships. Our friendships and our loves can all benefit from the honesty that comes from engaging in a dialogue with the unconscious.

The efficacy of Freud's psychoanalysis as a means of treating psychiatric disorders can be questioned, and while it may not offer much in terms of a psychiatric cure, I do think that our lives and relationships can be more enriched by the insights of this new way of speaking.

Tuesday 20 March 2012

Existential Morality

The moral aspect of Sartre's existentialism, as I understand it:

Existence precedes essence. There is no 'human nature': man is what he wills himself to be. There are no ends or goals that he is constrained to look up to. God does not exist and therefore no moral rule or code can legitimize itself by the fact that God imposed it. Even if God existed and imposed these moral rules, men would still be able to challenge them, just like the rules of any political authority. In his existential freedom man can always ask God "Why should I obey?". No authority can legitimize any moral code of conduct, nothing can make it binding on us. In the absence of objective moral rules, no action is ever impermissible, and neither is an action ever justified.

Ethics is like art. Our responses to specific moral situations are creative acts that we are forced to invent by our free choice. We cannot judge these choices to be morally right or wrong (because there is no objective morality) but we can judge these choices, just like we can judge an artist's work despite that there is no objective aesthetics. We can judge whether these choices are based on error or truth (logical judgement), and we can judge whether people are guilty of self-deception (mauvaise foi) and dishonesty towards their own freedom by excusing their actions as a result of human passion, fate or determinism, and not the result of their own choice. 

Everything is permitted, but not everything is beyond judgement.

Wednesday 14 March 2012

Positivism

Courtesy of Maverick Philosopher:

"... the Nietzsche quotation that Richard von Mises uses for the motto of his book Positivism (Harvard University Press, 1951, p. xii): 

. . . die kleinen, unscheinbaren vorsichtigen Wahrheiten, welche mit strenger Methode gefunden werden, hoeher zu schaetzen als jene weiten, schwebenden, umschleiernden Allgemeinheiten, nach denen das Beduerfnis religoeser oder kuenstlerischer Zeitalter greift.

. . . to value more highly the little, unpretentious, cautious truths, arrived at by rigorous methods, than those vast, floating, veiling generalities for which the yearnings of a religious or artistic era reach."

Wednesday 7 March 2012

Cosmic Religious Optimism


This post is a shorter chopped up version of the article Reincarnation and the Meaning of Life by John Hick. I edited the article to reduce its length and make it more accessible for readers who do not relish long reads (though I'm afraid it's still long for a blogpost), and to emphasize more on the central thesis. If it titillates your interest, do read the complete article; it is definitely worth it.

-------
Reincarnation and the Meaning of Life
John Hick


Nietzsche puts forward the idea of eternal recurrence, the endless repetition in every detail of the entire history of the universe, including our own lives, and including this present moment. In his own books the idea comes as the most penetrating possible question about the value of each individual's life and of human life generally. Has your life thus far been such that you would want to live it again and again endlessly, exactly the same in every minutest detail? And would you want human history as a whole to be repeated endlessly, just as it has been? To say Yes is, for Nietzsche, the ultimate affirmation of life by his ideal type, the Over- or Higher- or Superman, who however does not yet exist except in his imagined Zarathustra. 

Let us turn to David Hume who asks the same challenging question but, as the cool and lucid thinker that he was, without the poetic extravagance of eternal recurrence. He has one of the characters in his Dialogues, Demea, say ‘Ask yourself, ask any of your acquaintance, whether they would live over again the last ten or twenty years of their life. No! but the next twenty, they say, will be better'. For however satisfying our life as a whole may have been during the last ten or twenty years, we can all think of innumerable points at which it could have been better, so that, if we are comparing the way it has been with the way it might have been with these improvements, we would say No to the actual in comparison with the improved version. But we must eliminate this comparison in our thought experiment. I have to try to look back on my life as a whole during the last ten or twenty years and ask whether I would wish to live it again just as it has been, not changed or improved in any way, and without knowing that it had all happened before. It would be exactly as though one was living it for the first time, the alternative being not having existed at all.

Setting the question up in this way I think that Hume (though not the Demea in his dialogues), and also Nietzsche, and indeed all of us would opt to live it again. Only very few very unhappy people living in deep depression or in utterly unbearable circumstances of some kind would, I think, wish not to have existed. I suspect that even the millions in our world now living in dire poverty, anxiety and danger hope, with Demea, that the next years will be better and will thus make the past span of life worthwhile, not in itself but because it will have led on to that better future.

But on the other hand, still focussing on those millions who have lived in hope that life would in the future become better for them, or perhaps for their children, when we look back over human history we see that in a very large proportion of cases that hope was not in fact fulfilled. And so we have to ask whether we would want that entire history to be endlessly repeated in an eternal recurrence, or indeed in a single recurrence. If we think of ourselves simply as individuals, I would say Yes, as one of those who have been fortunate in the lottery of life. But should I say Yes on behalf of humanity as a totality, including those who have been desperately unlucky in that lottery? Would I want those who have lived in miserable slavery, or in constant fear and anxiety, or with debilitating and painful diseases, to have to live that life again and again without knowing, as they did not, that their situation was never in fact going to change for the better? Would I want those who have become sadistic monsters, from serial rapists and murderers to evil dictators, to live again and again? Would I want all the wars, persecutions, tortures, murders, rapes, cruelties and all the famines, droughts, floods, earthquakes and diseases to happen again and again? This is a challenge to the world religions, because each of them is in its own way a form of cosmic optimism, affirming the positive value of the totality of the process of which human history in this world is, according to them, a phase.

Moving within the realm of religious possibilities, and on the culturally forbidden subject of death, we are confronted by two very different options. Most westerners, whether they accept, or more often reject, the idea of a life after death think in terms of an eternal heaven and hell. For most easteners, on the other hand, what they either accept or reject is the idea of a journey through many lives. Which of these options is for us the standard idea to be either accepted or rejected depends in the great majority of cases on where we were born. However philosophy, in contrast to theology, tries to transcend this global postcode lottery. And it seems to me that, given the possibility of more life than the present one, then from a religious point of view the eastern model is to be preferred. For at the end of this short life very few, if indeed any, are ready for either eternal bliss or eternal punishment. But on the other hand all are ready for further growth and development. And if such a process is indeed taking place, we are all clearly at an early stage in it. If it is to proceed it requires further interactions with others within a common environment. It seems that this must take the form of further mortal lives, lived within the boundaries of birth and death, because it is the inexorable pressure of these boundaries that gives life the urgency that an unlimited horizonless future would lack. The cosmic scenario that best meets these requirements is some form of the concept of rebirth or reincarnation. So this is the option that I now want to explore a little.

Let me bring in at this point Milan Kundera's strange but striking novel The Unbearable Lightness of Being. At one point he has his central character Tomas reflect as follows: ‘Somewhere out in space there was another planet where all people would be born again. They would be fully aware of the life they had spent on earth and of all the experiences they had amassed here. And perhaps there was still another planet, where we would all be born a third time with the experience of our first two lives. And perhaps there were yet more planets, where mankind would be born one degree (one life) more mature. . . Of course we here on earth (planet number one, the planet of inexperience) can only fabricate vague fantasies of what will happen to man on those other planets. Will he be wiser? Is maturity within man's power? Can he attain it through repetition? Only [Kundera says] from the perspective of such a utopia is it possible to use the concepts of pessimism and optimism with full justification: an optimist is one who thinks that on planet number five the history of mankind will be less bloody. A pessimist is one who thinks otherwise'. This points very well to the sense in which, within the multiple lives option, religion involves the cosmic optimism which believes that through a series of lives in which any moral/spiritual maturing achieved in one is carried forward to the next, human existence will eventually be perfected. Each life story, and the human story as a whole, will lead eventually to a limitlessly good state. This cosmic optimism anticipates an end state that has a value in itself so great as to make worthwhile the long path that has led to it, so that in retrospect we will all be profoundly glad to have travelled it.

In Kundera's imagined scenario he looks forwards from human life as it now is to a supposed better future. But let us try the thought experiment of thinking back from that imagined future better state. Suppose that on the fifth planet human beings have become distinctly more caring towards one another, distinctly more inclined to care for their neighbour as much as for themselves, no longer able to be stirred to communal hatreds and wars, sharing the earth's resources equitably – by no means yet perfect beings in a perfect society but manifestly having moved in that direction. If we were part of that future world, and could see the emerging projectory, would we think that the earlier stages are now justified retrospectively by the increasingly better states to which they have led? We know what pain and suffering and despair and unhappiness there is in the world today. Would even this be justified within Kundera's imagined scenario?

I think that most of us, perhaps all of us, including those who now suffer most, would say Yes. We would all think that if that is indeed what is going on then we are glad to exist rather than not exist as part of this process. It is not a matter of a balancing compensation in the hereafter for pain suffered is this life but of the ultimate fulfilment of the human potential. In the course of this some may well have suffered much more than others – at any rate this is certainly the case within any one particular lifetime, - and yet all will have come by their own individual paths to the same end. Some may well have had a harder journey than others, and in this respect life may very well not be fair. It may be more like the situation in Jesus' parable of the workers in the vineyard who all receive the same reward even though some have done much more work than others. Further, in the scenario we are considering, it is not the case that the particular experiences which happen to each individual were specifically necessary to lead them to the future great good, or that the events of each person's life had to be just as they are, nor that the course of our lives is planned or directed by an omnipotent and loving God. Rather what happens occurs through the unpredictable interactions of very imperfect free beings. Remember that much the greater part of human suffering is caused by human actions or inactions. But whatever may be the largely accidental course of our life, or our many lives, it can – according to the religions - become the path by which we shall eventually have arrived at what John Bunyan symbolised in Christian terms as the Celestial City.

In both east and west the rebirth or reincarnation idea is popularly understood in an unsophisticated way as the present conscious self being born again in this world, including even sometimes being born in lower forms of animal life. But this popular picture is far from the conceptions found in some of the Buddhist and Hindu philosophies. These are themselves diverse, and there is no one official doctrine. But three major differences from the popular idea are fairly standard. The main one is that it is not the present conscious self that is re-embodied, not the persona gradually formed by the set of circumstances into which we are born - by our genetic inheritance, our various innate gifts and limitations, the family of which we are part, our short or long span of life, the region of the world and the society and culture and historical epoch in which we find ourselves, and the way things go in the world around us. That which is re-embodied in a future new conscious self is a deeper unconscious dispositional structure which Hindu philosophers speak of as the linga sharira, or subtle body – though this has to be understood within a whole philosophical framework in which it is not a body at all in our ordinary sense, - and which Buddhist philosophers speak of as a karmic bundle or complex. For them the conscious self is entirely evanescent, not an enduring substance. I suppose the most obvious Christian term for the deeper on-going self would be the soul. It is an aspect of our nature that exists far below the level of consciousness. All of the various factors in terms of which we live our conscious lives constitute, so the speak, the hand of cards which this deeper self has been dealt in this particular life, the stream of challenges and opportunities, capacities and limitations, with which life presents us. A major question, which I do not take up here, is whether or not some automatic process provides the reincarnating ‘soul' with a ‘hand of cards' appropriate to its need for further development. But what both affects and is affected by our basic dispositional structure is what the conscious personality makes of these cards. We are all the time both expressing and forming our deeper self by our responses to the circumstances, both agreeable and disagreeable, in which we find ourselves. And it is this cumulative quality of response that is built into the basic moral/spiritual character that will be re-embodied in another conscious personality.

Yet another difference from the popular conception is that in the more philosophical eastern reincarnation, or rebirth, doctrines there is generally no conscious memory of previous lives, even though such supposed memories abound in popular folklore. As Gandhi wrote, ‘It is nature's kindness that we do not remember past births. Where is the good of knowing in detail the numberless births we have gone through? Life would be a burden if we carried such a tremendous load of memories'. A latent memory of the totality of our experience is however integral to the dispositional or karmic continuant which is expressed in each successive new conscious personality. There may or may not, as some claim, be occasional leakages of fragments of this complete memory into someone's consciousness. But normally not. However the full accumulation of memory nevertheless exists beneath normal consciousness. According to the traditional story, when the Buddha attained to full enlightenment during his night of deep meditation under the Bo tree at Bodh Gaya he remembered the complete succession of his previous lives. It is in virtue of this normally inaccessible thread of memory that the many lives are different moments in the same life project.

Returning now to Kundera, in his imagined scenario we do not now, in the first world, know what the future holds. Suppose however we had come to the belief that we are in fact taking part in a journey from world number one to world number five and then to yet further worlds beyond. Would not this change the way in which we experience and engage in our present life in world number one, the world as he says of immaturity? Would it not give a new and different meaning to what is now happening?

This is the place to note that this basic cosmic optimism is marred within the monotheisms by their traditional doctrine of an eternal hell. And given the prior assumption that this present life is the only one there is, so that there is no possibility of continued maturing and moral growth beyond death – and the traditional doctrine of purgatory does not allow for this, - it is natural to think that some have proved themselves to be so wicked that their destiny can only be either hell or, more mercifully, annihilation. The fear of hell was of course also, notoriously, been used for many centuries as a tool of social control. Julian of Norwich was one of the minority of pre-modern Christian thinkers, and Jalaluldin Rumi a hundred years earlier one of the minority of Muslim thinkers, who have been hospitable to the idea of universal salvation; and it may well be significant that they were both mystics, that is to say experiencers, rather than writers of dogmatic theology. Buddhism and Hinduism, on the other hand, believing in many further lives to come, have much less need for an eternal hell. Their cosmologies do indeed include many states that are generally called hells, but these are states through which people pass, not to which they consigned for eternity. It may even be that we are in one of these now. But the cosmic optimism of these faiths, shared by various strands of Christianity, holds that the fundamental element of good at the core of our nature, the atman, or the universal Buddha nature, or the image of God within us, or ‘that of God in everyone', will eventually come to its complete fulfilment through the course of many lives, each bounded by birth and death and thus subject to the creative pressure of mortality.

Bringing all this to bear on the question of the meaning of our present lives, the hypothesis before us is that we are presently engaged in one phase, by no means necessarily the first, of a multi-life process of moral and spiritual growth within a universe which is, as the world religions affirm, ultimately benign or, speaking metaphorically, friendly. But how can it be said to be benign when it involves all the suffering, all the agony and despair, all the cruelty and wickedness that exist around us? Only, I think, if we grant the very high value of moral freedom and the consequent principle that goodness gradually created through our own free responses to ethically and physically challenging situations is enormously, we could even say infinitely, more valuable than a goodness implanted in us without any effort on our part. Putting this in the terms in which it appears in the intra-Christian theodicy debates, this is the Irenaean suggestion (as distinguished from the Augustinian theology) that God created humanity, not as already perfect beings who then disastrously fell, but as spiritually and morally immature creatures who are able to grow, through their own free decisions within a world that functions according to natural law and is not designed for their comfort, so that there are pains as well as pleasures, hardships to be endured, problems to be solved, difficult choices to be made, the possibility of real setbacks and accidents and of real failure and tragedy.

But – to voice the obvious objection – surely a loving God would not allow the extremities of human, and also animal, suffering that actually occur. The intra-Christian debate involves at this point the question whether God could intervene to prevent ‘man's inhumanity to man' or nature's perils without infringing either human freedom or the autonomy of the physical world. But since I am not postulating an omnipotent loving personal God, I leave that debate aside. I am postulating instead a cosmic process of which we are part, which we do not understand, which we often find to be harsh, sometimes extremely harsh, which we find to involve both great happinesses and great miseries, but which is nevertheless found in mystical experience within each of the great religions to be, from our human point of view, ultimately benign.

Saturday 3 March 2012

Abortion and Infanticide

In a paper that has outraged many, and rightly so, Alberto Giubilini and Francesca Minerva argue that there is no moral difference between a fetus and a newborn, neither of whom has the moral status of a person, therefore "‘after-birth abortion’ (killing a newborn) should be permissible in all the cases where abortion is, including cases where the newborn is not disabled."

While I do find this proposal morally abhorrent, I do think that the argument that there is no difference in the moral status of fetus and a newborn is worth considering. If the difference between a fetus and a newborn is merely passage through the birth canal, then indeed I find it difficult to see why this change of geography should constitute a significant change in moral status. Being pro-choice, I have been trying to grapple with this problem for quite some time. The problem is most people have the impression that if abortion is morally permissible, then this permission extends right to the very last moment of gestation, the moment before the baby is born. This leads to a very counter-intuitive picture: It is morally okay to kill a baby right before it's born, but it is morally wrong to kill a baby right after it's born. The mere act of delivery itself cannot justify such a radical change of moral status.

The mistake here is to believe that the moral status of a fetus remains constant and uniform through out the course of pregnancy. I believe it is otherwise. There is a huge difference in the moral status of a first trimester fetus and a third trimester fetus. People are misguided in thinking that it is the time of delivery that constitutes the definitive moral moment between abortion and infanticide. I believe the definitive moral moment is the age of viability, the age at which it is possible for a fetus to survive outside the uterus. The age of viability not just depends on the developmental capacities of the fetus but also on the available medical technology that is required to keep the pre-term infant alive, and therefore it is imprecise. In the Western world the age of viability is currently 20 weeks of gestation, which puts it in the mid of 2nd trimester. In the developing countries it ranges from 24-28 weeks of gestation. I take late-term abortion to be the termination of pregnancy that is after the age of viability, and I do not think that there is much difference (even though a difference is there) in the moral status of a late-term abortion and infanticide. If that is so, then indeed it is hard to avoid the conclusion that infanticide should be permissible in all the cases where a late-term abortion is. But I do not think that infanticide is morally permissible, and therefore I do not think a late-term abortion is morally permissible, despite being pro-choice. For me the age of viability is the morally decisive line, not the day of delivery.

Tuesday 28 February 2012

The Fictionalization of Love

"This is the fictionalization of love, the fact that the confidences that couples exchange are provided for them, structurally, because it is structurally necessary that these confidences by exchanged. Modern love would be unthinkable without fiction, romantic fiction in particular.... consider the modern situation. Each modern couple has to devise for itself a history which will justify its existence as a couple, on the basis of zero personal experience. Lovers cannot model their conduct on that of siblings or friends because even the best of friends or the closest of siblings have to hold back, for the sake of discretion. Hence it is necessary that sentimental education should take place via fictional rather than real exemplars, relayed via romantic novels, films and soaps on the TV. Fictions are plentiful, life-chances are few; it is not a condemnation of modern society to remark, as has often been done, that popular fiction proceeds and guides the actions of real-life lovers, rather than representing real life after the fact. Fiction is a giant simulation, an external thought-process, which provides individuals with the scripts they cannot do without and which non-fictional experience cannot supply. This means that we cannot put love-fiction to one side as if it were less authentic than real life. Fiction is, where modern societies are concerned, what genealogy is in those societies which have marriage rules, i.e. the means of producing the relationships on which social life depends. Fiction, re-enacted as real life, produces the histories on which relationships and society at large are grounded."

Alfred GellOn Love

Love as Concealment

"Love is the ultimate indiscretion.... knowledge about love is not like knowledge about cabbages, which do not mind being known about. Love is constituted through the dual process of mutual exposure (between lovers) combined with concealment (from everybody else). To discuss love at all as a topic for research papers is in some ways to contradict the essence of love. Of course, I know that many loving couples conduct themselves in a very amorous way in public; but nonetheless these public displays only serve to hint at much more spectacular and shameful goings-on which take place behind closed doors. I know too that when questioned by researchers individuals and couples will speak at length, and often with alarming frankness, about their sex-lives. But these confessions are made, usually, with the assurance that the information divulged will never be traced back to the individuals concerned and will, with luck, be tucked away from public gaze in statistical tables published in journals only read by desiccated academics, who might as well come from outer space. Moreover, the social-scientific confessional mode deals with sex, rather than love, which I regard as somewhat distinct. What I consider impossible is that social scientific interrogation will ever be able to unearth true, authentic, love-secrets, just because once such secrets are surrendered to the public they are automatically devalued. When one of Princess Diana’s lovers goes public, he is disqualified as a lover and becomes a cad and an exploiter. What can such a person tell us of love, since he is obviously incapable of it? Hence we can never know about love because the process of coming to know about love, from the third-party standpoint, annihilates the very entity about which we seek to know."

Alfred Gell, On Love

Monday 27 February 2012

Allow

If free will leads to inevitable suffering, was it moral on God's part to allow us free will?

Sunday 26 February 2012

The Inexpressible

"What causes hesitation is the fact that, after all, Mr Wittgenstein manages to say a good deal about what cannot be said, thus suggesting to the sceptical reader that possibly there may be some loophole through a hierarchy of languages, or by some other exit. The whole subject of ethics, for example, is placed by Mr Wittgenstein in the mystical, inexpressible region. Nevertheless he is capable of conveying his ethical opinions. His defence would be that what he calls the mystical can be shown, although it cannot be said. It may be that this defence is adequate, but, for my part, I confess that it leaves me with a certain sense of intellectual discomfort."

Bertrand Russell, on Wittgenstein's Tractatus

Monday 13 February 2012

Self-loathing

X: Objectively speaking, I'm a much more horrible person than you are. Yet I'm not plagued by self-loathing. Does the secret between sanity and insanity lies herein? 

Friday 10 February 2012

Russell on Happiness

Russell on happiness: an insightful over-view of Bertrand Russell's views on happiness, certainly an important predecessor of positive psychology.

Tuesday 7 February 2012

confusion is the new clarity

I: A's boyfriend seems to be a fashionable man in matters of heart :D Now a days, with regards to love, confusion is the new clarity.

God and Chaos

"It's hard to accept the idea that there cannot be an order in the universe because it would offend the free will of God and His omnipotence. So the freedom of God is our condemnation, or at least the condemnation of our pride."

I dared, for the first and last time in my life, to express a theological conclusion: "But how can a necessary being exist totally polluted with the possible? What difference is there, then, between God and primigenial chaos? Isn't affirming God's absolute omnipotence and His absolute freedom with regards to His own choices tantamount to demonstrating that God does not exist?"

Umberto Eco, The Name of the Rose

Wednesday 1 February 2012

Some Thoughts on Islamic Feminism


Saying that Quran is not inherently a patriarchal text does not automatically imply that Quran is inherently feminist either. Of course, feminist interpretations of Islam are possible but patriarchal interpretations are not just possible, they are already existing and dominant, and one cannot see much objective reason as to why a feminist interpretation should have more theological validity than a patriarchal interpretation as being the true interpretation, apart from the fact that it corresponds to feminist morality. If Quran cannot be read and understood at all without some sort of interpretation being imposed on it during the process, as the enthusiastic liberal Muslims who play the interpretation card would like to believe, then it implies that the text alone is devoid of meaning and there is nothing inherent to the Quran. It is inherently neither patriarchal nor feminist; it becomes either of these by virtue of the interpretation we choose to see it through. Yet this conclusion is something that would make most Muslims feminists uncomfortable, because they would like to believe that the “true Islam” conforms to their moral values of feminism. Apart from the uncommon Islamic variants which de-emphasize the centrality of textual interpretation in religion, such a deconstructed view of scripture is indeed awkward for most practising Muslims.

Some Islamic feminists say that Islam recognizes men and women as equal but prescribes different gender roles for them given their biological differences. Sounds neat, but it is a problematic position from a feminist point of view. It is not entirely clear how much biological gender can determine social gender roles. The tendency has been to view gender as primarily a socio-cultural construct (‘One is not born a woman, but becomes one’) and feminism has been in many ways a rebellion against the social norms of what women are and aren’t supposed to do. If Islam does indeed prescribe different gender roles, and it is a conclusion hard to avoid unless you resort to radical leaps of interpretations, then it is rendering itself an easy target for feminist attacks. All prescriptions of gender roles have a certain oppression about them. Furthermore, this is guilty of a binary conception of gender and ignores androgyny in its entirety.

The problem of reconciling Islam and Feminism becomes all the more apparent when we consider a topic like homosexuality. In this case Islamic feminists who support homosexuality have to explain away many Quranic verses (story of Lot, for instance) and hadiths which admonish against homosexuality, and even if we presume that this explaining away can be done successfully, there is still nothing left that is in favor of homosexuality. It may be possible to say that Islam can be interpreted in a way that makes it compatible with homosexuality, yet no one can demonstrate that Islam supports homosexuality, that Islam argues for homosexual rights. There is simply no textual evidence in positive acceptance of homosexuality, and this leaves a big chasm at the very heart of Islamic feminism. Clearly, the justified and well-cherished feminist support of homosexuality cannot be derived from the Quran. Therefore, feminism has at least some moral values on which Quran is, at best, silent.

Another example that can be brought up is that of the moral status of pre-marital consensual sex. Western Feminists are vastly accepting of consensual sex regardless of the marital status and do not deem it to be morally objectionable. Islamic Feminists tend to tip-toe around this. We may see them arguing that Islam doesn’t treat fornication as a legal crime, even though it does; the 4 witnesses requirement may be an unlikely possibility to fulfill in practice but it exists in theory. Let us give the benefit of doubt to the Islamic feminists and suppose that this can be successfully explained away and consensual sex is de-criminalized. Nonetheless, there is still no moral approval or acceptance of a casual sexual encounter in Islam. Islam morally prohibits pre-marital sex and all Islamic feminists who may believe that consensual sex is not to be morally judged and disapproved have a lot of explaining to do. And all Islamic feminists who disapprove of consensual sex also have a lot of explaining to do because it is a seemingly un-feminist stance to morally restrict sex to marriage.

These examples can be used to demonstrate the two grades of Islamic Feminism: 

Weak Islamic Feminism: Islam and feminism are not mutually exclusive.
Strong Islamic Feminism: The feminist principles and values are already present in Islam and can be derived from them.

The feminist support of homosexuality and consensual sex, among other things, is in my view a refutation of Strong Islamic Feminism. Weak Islamic Feminism is a position that can be consistently argued for, though it still requires feats of creative interpretations, and has the accompanying (awkward) conclusions that Islam is not inherently feminist and that there are at least some feminist moral values that are meta-Quranic. Either way it shows that Islamic Feminism is yet to explore these questions in philosophical depth and is not likely to be successful unless it is accompanied by a broader reformative theology that tackles the problems of textual interpretation.

Saturday 28 January 2012

A Vocabulary of Delights

A young monk, with little exposure to the company of women, finds himself aroused and seduced by a peasant girl:

"What did I feel? What did I see? I remember only that the emotions of the first moment were bereft of any expression, because my tongue and my mind had not been instructed in how to name sensations of that sort. Until I recalled other inner words, heard in another time and in other places, spoken certainly for other ends, but which seemed wondrously in keeping with my joy in that moment, as if they had been born consubstantially to express it. Words pressed into the caverns of my memory rose to the (dumb) surface of my lips, and I forget that they had served in Scripture or in the pages of the saints to express quite different, more radiant realities. But was there truly a difference between the delights of which the saints had spoken and those that my agitated spirit was feeling at that moment?" [Umberto Eco, The Name of the Rose]

Unacquainted with the vocabulary of love, this young man caught in the moment of passion finds himself helplessly uttering words from the scripture.

We may also imagine its converse, a more familiar example: devoid of a proper vocabulary, a mystic caught in divine ecstasy finds himself helplessly uttering words of passion, love and desire.

Annie Oakley Heart Target


Annie Oakley’s heart target

Monday 23 January 2012

A Little of It

"And when the grace and protection of the Divine Mother are with you, what is there that can touch you or whom need you fear? A little of it even will carry you through all difficulties, obstacles, dangers..."

Sri Aurobindo

Saturday 21 January 2012

Winter Park: A Minimalist Reproduction



A minimalist reproduction of:


Uzzle Burk, Winter Park, Central Park, New York, 2000